Data-opolies

13 Pages Posted: 4 Mar 2017 Last revised: 30 Apr 2018

See all articles by Maurice E. Stucke

Maurice E. Stucke

University of Tennessee College of Law

Allen P. Grunes

Brownstein Hyatt Farber Schreck, LLP

Date Written: March 3, 2017

Abstract

In contrast to the European Commission, the U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission have not meaningfully prosecuted monopolistic abuses over the past 16 years. The U.S. Supreme Court’s view on monopolies has also become forgiving. There is no empirical support that monopolies—whether in dynamic or static markets—are generally good for society.

Yes, one might say. But with the expansion of the data-driven economy, one has less to fear of monopolization. We debunk these myths in our book, Big Data and Competition Policy (Oxford University Press 2016). Our aim here is to summarize several reasons why data-driven markets can be monopolized, and identify one recent example of a data-driven exclusionary tactic. Thus, prosecuting monopolistic abuses is even more important in certain online industries.

Keywords: Monopoly, Antitrust, Big Data, Network Effects

JEL Classification: K21, L40, L41

Suggested Citation

Stucke, Maurice E. and Grunes, Allen P., Data-opolies (March 3, 2017). CONCURRENCES No. 2-2017 (2017), University of Tennessee Legal Studies Research Paper No. 316, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2927018 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2927018

Maurice E. Stucke (Contact Author)

University of Tennessee College of Law ( email )

1505 W. Cumberland Ave.
Knoxville, TN 37996
United States
865-974-9816 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.mauricestucke.com

Allen P. Grunes

Brownstein Hyatt Farber Schreck, LLP ( email )

1155 F Street, NW
Suite 1200
Washington, DC 20004
United States

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