Brighter and Darker Sides of Intermediation: Target-Oriented and Self-Interested Intermediaries in the Regulatory Governance of Buildings

34 Pages Posted: 9 Mar 2017

See all articles by Jeroen van der Heijden

Jeroen van der Heijden

Victoria University of Wellington, School of Government; Australian National University, School of Regulation & Global Governance (RegNet)

Date Written: March 8, 2017

Abstract

This article addresses two specific puzzles in the area of regulation. The first is the engagement of regulatory intermediaries by the targets of regulation. The second is a tendency for regulatory intermediaries, once added to the regulatory landscape, to expand their roles independently and for reasons of self-interest. The article offers important insights into the roles, opportunities, and constraints of regulatory intermediaries, particularly because it moves beyond the unidirectional understanding of the regulatory process that is at the base of the RIT model. After exploring both puzzles, the article discusses how (target-oriented or self-interested) intermediation may increase the complexity and impact of regulatory capture. It concludes, however, that, while the model of intermediation is sometimes flawed, regulators and targets are generally better off with the involvement of regulatory intermediaries than without it.

Keywords: regulatory intermediaries; building regulation; urban governance; regulatory capture; regulatory governance

Suggested Citation

van der Heijden, Jeroen, Brighter and Darker Sides of Intermediation: Target-Oriented and Self-Interested Intermediaries in the Regulatory Governance of Buildings (March 8, 2017). RegNet Research Paper No. 127, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2929564 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2929564

Jeroen Van der Heijden (Contact Author)

Victoria University of Wellington, School of Government ( email )

PO Box 600
Wellington 6140
New Zealand

HOME PAGE: http://https://www.victoria.ac.nz/sog/about/staff/jeroen-vanderheijden

Australian National University, School of Regulation & Global Governance (RegNet) ( email )

Australian National University
Building #8
Canberra, Australian Capital Territory 0200
Australia

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