The False Promise of Publicly Offered Private Placements

24 Pages Posted: 17 Mar 2017 Last revised: 2 Jun 2017

See all articles by Manning G. Warren

Manning G. Warren

University of Louisville - Louis D. Brandeis School of Law

Date Written: September 4, 2015

Abstract

This article addresses Congress’s promise that an exemption for private placements publicly offered to accredited investors, as mandated by Title II of the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (JOBS Act), would provide greater access to capital for our nation’s businesses. Based on an extensive survey of Form D data for the eighteen month period following promulgation of the Securities and Exchange Commission’s new Rule 506(c), the author concludes that only a relative paucity of issuers have taken advantage of Congress’s beneficence. The author also discusses what he has identified as the primary factors that explain issuers’ reluctance to rely on the Rule 506(c) exemption, as well as survey data obtained from securities lawyers whose practices include representation of private placement issuers. The article concludes that while Rule 506(c) might be hailed as the ultimate platform for accredited investor crowdfunding, it has yet to achieve its promise.

Keywords: private placements, general solicitation, crowdfunding, verified accredited investors, self-certified accredited investors, accredited strangers, capital formation, exempt offerings, covered securities

JEL Classification: G00, G18, G24, G28, G32, G34, G38

Suggested Citation

Warren, Manning G., The False Promise of Publicly Offered Private Placements (September 4, 2015). SMU Law Review, Vol. 68, 2015, University of Louisville School of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series No. 2017-6, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2933538

Manning G. Warren (Contact Author)

University of Louisville - Louis D. Brandeis School of Law ( email )

Wilson W. Wyatt Hall
Louisville, KY 40292
United States

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