Asset Mispricing

51 Pages Posted: 19 Mar 2017 Last revised: 24 Jun 2023

See all articles by Kurt F. Lewis

Kurt F. Lewis

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

Francis A. Longstaff

University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - Finance Area

Lubomir Petrasek

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: March 2017

Abstract

We use a unique dataset of corporate bonds guaranteed by the full faith and credit of the U.S. to test a number of recent theories about why asset prices may diverge from fundamental values. These models emphasize the role of funding liquidity, slow-moving capital, the leverage of financial intermediaries, and other frictions in allowing mispricing to occur. Consistent with theory, we find there are strong patterns of commonality in mispricing and that changes in dealer haircuts and funding costs are significant drivers of mispricing. Furthermore, mispricing can trigger short-term margin and funding-cost spirals. Using detailed bond and dealer-level data, we find that most of the cross-sectional variation in mispricing is explained by differences in dealer funding costs, inventory positions, and trading liquidity measures. These results provide strong empirical support for a number of current theoretical models.

Suggested Citation

Lewis, Kurt F. and Longstaff, Francis A. and Petrasek, Lubomir, Asset Mispricing (March 2017). NBER Working Paper No. w23231, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2935436

Kurt F. Lewis (Contact Author)

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System ( email )

20th Street and Constitution Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20551
United States

HOME PAGE: http://kurtflewis.com

Francis A. Longstaff

University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - Finance Area ( email )

Los Angeles, CA 90095-1481
United States
310-825-2218 (Phone)
310-206-5455 (Fax)

Lubomir Petrasek

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System ( email )

20th Street and Constitution Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20551
United States

Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?

Paper statistics

Downloads
93
Abstract Views
1,372
Rank
431,327
PlumX Metrics