Dynamic Pricing with Search Frictions

Abstract

This paper studies dynamic pricing in a market with search frictions. Sellers have a single unit of a good and post prices in every trading period. Buyers have to incur a search cost to match with a new seller and upon matching they observe the price and the realization of some idiosyncratic match value. There is no discounting but trade ends at an exogenously given deadline. We show that equilibrium involves trading in finitely many trading periods and the volume of trade increases over time. Under mild conditions on the buyer-to-seller ratio and the distribution of valuations, prices decrease at increase rates as the deadline approaches. We derive the gains from trade in equilibrium and their distribution between buyers and sellers. For the case in which the measures of buyers and sellers coincide, we provide a full characterization of the (unique) equilibrium for a class of distribution functions. We finally discuss implications for market design, including the use of platform fees and cancellation policies.

Keywords: Consumer Search; Dynamic Pricing; Sharing Economy

JEL Classification: D11, D83, L13