The Impact of Parking Policy on House Prices

TI 2017-037/VIII Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper

15 Pages Posted: 19 Apr 2017

See all articles by Jesper de Groote

Jesper de Groote

Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, School of Business and Economics

Jos N. van Ommeren

Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, School of Business and Economics; Tinbergen Institute

Hans Koster

Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, School of Business and Economics

Date Written: April 10, 2017

Abstract

Paid parking is the recommended policy tool by economists to deal with excess demand for street parking. However, we know very little about the effects of this policy on residents. This is particularly important in the context that residents have political power and usually vote against paid parking when it is detrimental to residents. Hence, in our analysis, we take into account that residents receive residential parking permits which provides political support for paid parking. We estimate the combined effect of a paid-parking parking policy – i.e. the introduction of paid parking and residential parking permits on residents – by examining its effect on house prices. We focus on Amsterdam and Utrecht using data over a period of 30 years. We do not find any effect of this paid-parking policy on house prices. This finding is consistent with the idea that residents only vote in favor of a local policy when it has no negative impact on their house prices.

Keywords: parking, parking policy, hedonic price analysis

JEL Classification: R20, R40

Suggested Citation

de Groote, Jesper and van Ommeren, Jos N. and Koster, Hans, The Impact of Parking Policy on House Prices (April 10, 2017). TI 2017-037/VIII Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper , Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2954458 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2954458

Jesper De Groote (Contact Author)

Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, School of Business and Economics ( email )

De Boelelaan 1105
Amsterdam, 1081HV
Netherlands

Jos N. Van Ommeren

Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, School of Business and Economics ( email )

De Boelelaan 1105
Amsterdam, 1081HV
Netherlands

Tinbergen Institute ( email )

Gustav Mahlerplein 117
Amsterdam, 1082 MS
Netherlands

Hans Koster

Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, School of Business and Economics ( email )

De Boelelaan 1105
Amsterdam, 1081HV
Netherlands

Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?

Paper statistics

Downloads
81
Abstract Views
641
Rank
551,552
PlumX Metrics