The Optimal Earned Income Tax Credit

- Regev, E. and M. Strawczynski (2020) "The Optimal Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) Schedule: A Trapezoid or a Triangle", The Bell Journal of Economic Analysis and Policy, 20 (3), 1-16.

42 Pages Posted: 12 May 2017 Last revised: 23 May 2023

See all articles by Eitan Regev

Eitan Regev

Hebrew University of Jerusalem - Department of Economics; Taub Center

Michel Strawczynski

Hebrew University of Jerusalem - Eliezer Kaplan School of Economics and Social Sciences; Hebrew University of Jerusalem _ Public Policy

Date Written: May 12, 2017

Abstract

In this paper we characterize the optimal linear and piecewise linear EITC schedule. In the linear framework we demonstrate that in the presence of unemployment, an increase of social inequality aversion and a decrease in labor aversion both derive in a lower optimal EITC. For the piecewise linear schedule, we show that in most cases the optimal schedule is a triangle, which is at odds with actual policy, that is based on a trapezoid. According to our simulation, the use of a trapezoid instead of a triangle implies a substantial loss in terms of Social Welfare. We show that a trapezoid is optimal only when the wage distribution among the working poor is even, with a discrete jump for higher wage groups. After mimicking the wage distribution in different countries, we show that changes in the share of the "very rich" have a lower impact on the optimal EITC compared to changes in the wage variance. Finally, we show that the main impact of an increased minimum wage on the optimal EITC schedule is a more pronounced phasing out.

Keywords: Optimal EITC, trapezoid, piecewise linear schedule

JEL Classification: H21, H24

Suggested Citation

Regev, Eitan and Strawczynski, Michel, The Optimal Earned Income Tax Credit (May 12, 2017). - Regev, E. and M. Strawczynski (2020) "The Optimal Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) Schedule: A Trapezoid or a Triangle", The Bell Journal of Economic Analysis and Policy, 20 (3), 1-16. , Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2967551 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2967551

Eitan Regev

Hebrew University of Jerusalem - Department of Economics ( email )

Mount Scopus
Jerusalem, 91905
Israel

Taub Center ( email )

15 Ha'ari Street
Jerusalem
Israel

Michel Strawczynski (Contact Author)

Hebrew University of Jerusalem - Eliezer Kaplan School of Economics and Social Sciences ( email )

Mount Scopus
Jerusalem, 9190501
Israel

HOME PAGE: http://michelstrawczynski.huji.ac.il/

Hebrew University of Jerusalem _ Public Policy ( email )

School of Public Policy
Jerusalem
Israel
972-2-5881531 (Phone)

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