Taking on the Boss: Informative Contests in Prosecutor Elections

26 Pages Posted: 25 May 2017

See all articles by Bryan C. McCannon

Bryan C. McCannon

Illinois Wesleyan University

Joylynn Pruitt

West Virginia University - Department of Economics

Date Written: February 23, 2017

Abstract

The United States is unique in that most states select their prosecutors using popular election. An interesting feature of prosecutor elections is that the pool of potential challengers to an incumbent comes primarily from subordinates within the office. We develop a signaling model that analyzes whether entry into the political race by a subordinate provides voters with useful information. We challenge the commonly-held presumption that the election mechanism is ineffective. Exploring the decision of an insider to challenge the boss, we demonstrate that a challenger can strategically convey information about the incumbent's quality by entering the race. Anticipating this, poor incumbents exit. Thus, the model matches empirical observations of rare contested elections and rather modest vacancy rates. Compared to the situation where outsiders challenge the incumbent, the election mechanism is effective.

Keywords: prosecutor, election, challenge

Suggested Citation

McCannon, Bryan C. and Pruitt, Joylynn, Taking on the Boss: Informative Contests in Prosecutor Elections (February 23, 2017). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2973375 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2973375

Bryan C. McCannon (Contact Author)

Illinois Wesleyan University ( email )

P.O. Box 2900
Bloomington, IL 61702-2900
United States

HOME PAGE: http://sites.google.com/site/bryancmccannon

Joylynn Pruitt

West Virginia University - Department of Economics ( email )

Morgantown, WV 26506
United States

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