Country Level Corruption and Accounting Choice: Research & Development Capitalization Under IFRS

Posted: 3 Jun 2017 Last revised: 31 May 2023

See all articles by Francesco Mazzi

Francesco Mazzi

University of Florence - Department of Business Economics

Richard Slack

Durham Business School

Ioannis Tsalavoutas

University of Glasgow - Accounting and Finance Group

Fanis Tsoligkas

University of Bath - School of Management

Date Written: February 11, 2019

Abstract

International Accounting Standard 38 Intangible Assets mandates that development costs must be capitalized if certain conditions specified in the standard are met. However, this requires managerial judgement and hence may be subject to opportunism. Corruption is a permeable informal country characteristic that penetrates firms’ behaviour, influencing corporate misconduct. We conjecture that an environment with high corruption facilitates management in their justification of meeting the capitalization criteria of assets that should have been expensed, either partly or entirely. Effectively, these capitalized assets will not generate the future economic benefits implicitly conveyed by their recognition. This recognition, however, sends positive (albeit distorted) market signals for future earnings and increases current year reported earnings. We find that there is a positive relation between country-level corruption and the amount of development costs capitalized in a given year. Moreover, the higher the levels of country corruption, the lower the contribution of capitalized development costs in a given year to future profitability. Finally, this association is moderated by companies’ levels of internationalization.

Keywords: R&D, IFRS, corruption, accounting choice, future performance, internationalisation

JEL Classification: M40, M41, M48

Suggested Citation

Mazzi, Francesco and Slack, Richard and Tsalavoutas, Ioannis and Tsoligkas, Fanis, Country Level Corruption and Accounting Choice: Research & Development Capitalization Under IFRS (February 11, 2019). The British Accounting Review 51, no. 5 (2019): 100821., Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2979300 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2979300

Francesco Mazzi

University of Florence - Department of Business Economics ( email )

Via delle Pandette 9
Florence, Florence 50132
Italy
0039 055 4374684 (Phone)
0039 055 4374910 (Fax)

Richard Slack

Durham Business School ( email )

Mill Hill Lane
Durham, Durham DH1 3LB
United Kingdom

Ioannis Tsalavoutas (Contact Author)

University of Glasgow - Accounting and Finance Group ( email )

Glasgow, Scotland G12 8QQ
United Kingdom

HOME PAGE: http://www.gla.ac.uk/schools/business/staff/yannistsalavoutas/

Fanis Tsoligkas

University of Bath - School of Management ( email )

Claverton Down
Bath, BA2 7AY
United Kingdom

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