Single Motherhood and the Abolition of Coverture in the United States

36 Pages Posted: 10 Jun 2017

See all articles by Hazem Alshaikhmubarak

Hazem Alshaikhmubarak

University of California, Santa Barbara (UCSB)

Rick Geddes

Cornell University - Department of Policy Analysis & Management (PAM)

Shoshana Amyra Grossbard

San Diego State University - Department of Economics; IZA Institute of Labor Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Date Written: May 23, 2017

Abstract

Under the common-law system of coverture in the United States, a married woman relinquished control of property and wages to her husband. Many U.S. states passed acts between 1850 and 1920 that expanded a married woman’s right to keep her market earnings and to own separate property. The former were called married women’s earnings acts (MWEAs) and the latter married women’s property acts (MWPAs). Scholarly interest in the acts’ effects is growing. Researchers have examined how the acts affected outcomes such as women’s wealth-holding and educational attainment. The acts’ impact on women’s non-marital birth decisions remains unexamined, however. We postulate that the acts caused women to anticipate greater benefits from having children within rather than outside of marriage. We thus expect passage of MWPAs and MWEAs to reduce the likelihood that single women become mothers of young children. We use probit regression to analyze individual data from the U.S. Census for the years 1860 to 1920. We find that the property acts in fact reduced the likelihood that single women have young children. We also find that the “de-coverture” acts’ effects were stronger for literate women, U.S.-born women, in states with higher female labor-force participation, and in more rural states, consistent with predictions.

Keywords: property, earnings, family, law, fertility, marriage

JEL Classification: D100

Suggested Citation

Alshaikhmubarak, Hazem and Geddes, Rick and Grossbard, Shoshana, Single Motherhood and the Abolition of Coverture in the United States (May 23, 2017). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 6471, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2983692 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2983692

Hazem Alshaikhmubarak

University of California, Santa Barbara (UCSB) ( email )

South Hall 5504
Santa Barbara, CA 93106
United States

Rick Geddes

Cornell University - Department of Policy Analysis & Management (PAM) ( email )

120 Martha Van Rensselaer Hall
Ithaca, NY 14853
United States

Shoshana Grossbard (Contact Author)

San Diego State University - Department of Economics ( email )

5500 Campanile Drive
San Diego, CA 92182
United States

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

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