From Politicised Budgeting to Political Budgets in the EU?

21 Pages Posted: 13 Jun 2017

See all articles by Ronny Patz

Ronny Patz

Geschwister-Scholl-Institut (GSI) für Politikwissenschaft, LMU München

Klaus Goetz

Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich (LMU) - Geschwister-Scholl-Institute of Political Science (GSI)

Date Written: July 1, 2015

Abstract

Recent studies on the evolution of the EU budget suggest that punctuated equilibrium models best explain its evolution over time. However, a number of factors have combined to bring about major changes in the processes of budgeting in the EU. The paper outlines the drivers of this change in the light of relevant theories, showing how growing politicisation of EU budgeting and the increasing importance of electoral cycles in EU policy-making have led the EU Commission, in conjunction with the European Parliament, to seek to tie budgeting closer to its own, electorally defined mandate. Following the 2014 European elections, the Juncker Commission developed an investment plan that would signal this electorally-driven change without requiring a formal adaptation of the budget procedure. While it is too early to speak of an irreversible development, there are clear indications that we may be witnessing a major shift in the developmental logic of the EU budget. If formalised, cyclical EU budgeting processes could establish the foundations for political budget cycles.

Keywords: European Union, Budget, Juncker Plan

Suggested Citation

Patz, Ronny and Goetz, Klaus, From Politicised Budgeting to Political Budgets in the EU? (July 1, 2015). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2984860 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2984860

Ronny Patz (Contact Author)

Geschwister-Scholl-Institut (GSI) für Politikwissenschaft, LMU München ( email )

Oettingenstrasse 67
Munich, 80538
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.en.gsi.uni-muenchen.de/people/academic/ronny_patz/index.html

Klaus Goetz

Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich (LMU) - Geschwister-Scholl-Institute of Political Science (GSI) ( email )

Munich
Germany

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