I (Don't) Like You! But Who Cares? Gender Differences in Same Sex and Mixed Sex Teams

29 Pages Posted: 19 Jun 2017

See all articles by Leonie Gerhards

Leonie Gerhards

University of Hamburg - Department of Economics

Michael Kosfeld

Goethe University Frankfurt; IZA Institute of Labor Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute); University of Bonn - Center for Development Research (ZEF)

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Abstract

We study the effect of likability on female and male team behavior in a lab experiment. Extending a two-player public goods game and a minimum effort game by an additional pre-play stage that informs team members about their mutual likability we find that female teams lower their contribution to the public good in case of low likability, while male teams achieve high levels of cooperation irrespective of the level of mutual likability. In mixed sex teams, both females' and males' contributions depend on mutual likability. Similar results are found in the minimum effort game. Our results offer a new perspective on gender differences in labor market outcomes: mutual dislikability impedes team behavior, except in all-male teams.

Keywords: gender differences, likability, experiment, team behavior

JEL Classification: C90, J16

Suggested Citation

Gerhards, Leonie and Kosfeld, Michael, I (Don't) Like You! But Who Cares? Gender Differences in Same Sex and Mixed Sex Teams. IZA Discussion Paper No. 10825, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2988172 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2988172

Leonie Gerhards (Contact Author)

University of Hamburg - Department of Economics ( email )

Von-Melle-Park 5
room 2060
Hamburg, 20146
Germany

Michael Kosfeld

Goethe University Frankfurt ( email )

Faculty of Economics and Business Administration
Theodor-W.-Adorno-Platz 4
Frankfurt am Main, 60323
Germany

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Schaumburg-Lippe-Str. 7 / 9
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute) ( email )

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

University of Bonn - Center for Development Research (ZEF) ( email )

Walter-Flex-Str. 3
Bonn, NRW 53113
Germany

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