An Empirical Analysis of the Effects of the Dodd-Frank Act on Determinants of Credit Ratings

Journal of Business Finance & Accounting

56 Pages Posted: 26 Jun 2017 Last revised: 1 Mar 2023

See all articles by Anwer S. Ahmed

Anwer S. Ahmed

Texas A&M University - Mays Business School

Dechun Wang

Texas A&M University

Nina Xu

University of Connecticut

Date Written: February 28, 2023

Abstract

We study the effects of the Dodd-Frank Act (“Dodd-Frank”) on determinants of credit ratings. We predict that the increase in regulatory oversight and litigation risk prompted by Dodd-Frank, as well as requirements for improved disclosures and governance, motivated credit rating agencies (CRAs) to increase the reliance on verifiable quantitative fundamental information in determining ratings. We find that the power of firm fundamentals in explaining credit ratings increases significantly after Dodd-Frank. Furthermore, we find that the greater reliance on quantitative firm fundamentals at least partially drives the improvement in credit ratings’ ability to predict future defaults. Collectively, our evidence suggests that Dodd-Frank incentivizes CRAs to use more quantitative information in making rating decisions, which improves credit rating quality.

Keywords: Dodd-Frank Act; Fundamental information; Credit rating; Default prediction

JEL Classification: G380; K220; M400

Suggested Citation

Ahmed, Anwer S. and Wang, Dechun and Xu, Nina, An Empirical Analysis of the Effects of the Dodd-Frank Act on Determinants of Credit Ratings (February 28, 2023). Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2991922 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2991922

Anwer S. Ahmed

Texas A&M University - Mays Business School ( email )

430 Wehner
College Station, TX 77843-4353
United States

Dechun Wang (Contact Author)

Texas A&M University ( email )

430 Wehner
College Station, TX 77843-4353
United States

Nina Xu

University of Connecticut ( email )

Storrs, CT 06269-1063
United States

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