Multiple Regional Agreements for Environmental Protection
14 Pages Posted: 29 Jun 2017
Date Written: June 15, 2017
Abstract
Asheim et al. (2006, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, vol.51, pp.93-109) show that participation in international environmental agreements (IEAs) can be doubled in a two-region world by the Regional Penance strategy, designating countries that are permitted to punish non-compliance, to sustain IEAs as weakly renegotiation-proof equilibrium. This study shows that broad participation and significant improvement in global welfare using IEAs can be achieved through a “multiple” regional coalition approach by modifying the Regional Penance strategy. As a result, this study succeeds in deriving the effectiveness of a regional cooperative approach for broad cooperation in the context of a repeated game framework.
Keywords: International Environmental Agreements; Trans-Boundary Pollution; Subgame Perfect Equilibrium; Renegotiation-Proof; Repeated Game; Regional Cooperation
JEL Classification: F53; H87; Q52; Q54
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation