The Effect of Government Contracting on Academic Research: An Empirical Analysis of Reputation in Research Procurement

Abstract

The growing share of university research funded by industry has sparked concerns that academics will sacrifice traditional scholarly activities to pursue commercial goals. To investigate this concern, I examine the influence of an applied sponsor and consider limitations of the grant funding mechanism. A novel dataset tracks the careers of academic engineers and their relationships with this sponsor. I find that a) researchers who maintain a relationship with the directed sponsor experience a decrease in publications implying that academics' careers may be a function of the type of funding received, not only talent, b) academic merit does not necessarily serve as a funding criterion for sponsors, and c) citation and publication measures of academic output are often not useful proxies for short-term commercial or social value.

Keywords: Reputation, R&D, Science Productivity, Science Funding, University-Industry Interface, Science Productivity measures

JEL Classification: L2, L3, H5, J4, O3