Social Comparisons in Oligopsony

38 Pages Posted: 19 Jul 2017

See all articles by Laszlo Goerke

Laszlo Goerke

University of Trier - Institute of Labour Law and Industrial Relations in the European Union; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute); IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Michael Neugart

Technical University of Darmstadt

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Date Written: June 21, 2017

Abstract

A large body of evidence suggests that social comparisons matter for workers’ valuation of the wage they receive. The consequences of social comparisons in imperfectly competitive labor markets are less well understood. We analyze an oligopsonistic model of the labor market where workers derive (dis-)utility from comparing their own wage with wages paid at other firms. As social comparisons become more prevalent all workers are paid higher wages, the wage distribution becomes more equal, and employment shifts to high productivity firms. Moreover, the total wage bill and output increase, while aggregate profits decline. Overall welfare rises. Our theoretical results have implications for estimating the elasticity of the labor supply curve facing a firm.

Keywords: social comparisons, status seeking, oligopsony, wage distribution, functional income distribution, welfare

JEL Classification: D620, J220, J420

Suggested Citation

Goerke, Laszlo and Neugart, Michael, Social Comparisons in Oligopsony (June 21, 2017). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 6528, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3003908 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3003908

Laszlo Goerke

University of Trier - Institute of Labour Law and Industrial Relations in the European Union ( email )

Behringstraße 21, 7. Floor, Building H
Trier, 54296
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.iaaeu.de/

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Schaumburg-Lippe-Str. 7 / 9
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Michael Neugart (Contact Author)

Technical University of Darmstadt ( email )

Hochschulstraße 1
Darmstadt, 64289
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.vwl3.wi.tu-darmstadt.de

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