Does Divorce Law Matter?
37 Pages Posted: 16 Feb 2002
Date Written: February 2002
Abstract
In this paper we derive an explicit model of negotiations between spouses when utility is (partially) transferable only in case of separation. We show that inefficient separation may occur in equilibrium even under consensual divorce law. This provides theoretical support for the view that changes in social norms rather than in legislation may be responsible for increasing divorce rates.
Keywords: Bargaining, Divorce, Non Transferability
JEL Classification: C78, J120
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?
Recommended Papers
-
Did Unilateral Divorce Raise Divorce Rates? Evidence from Panel Data
-
Did Unilateral Divorce Raise Divorce Rates? Evidence from Panel Data
-
Did Unilateral Divorce Laws Raise Divorce Rates? A Reconciliation and New Results
-
Did Unilateral Divorce Laws Raise Divorce Rates? A Reconciliation and New Results
-
The Labor Market Effects of Introducing National Health Insurance: Evidence from Canada
By Jonathan Gruber and Maria Hanratty
-
Is Making Divorce Easier Bad for Children? The Long Run Implications of Unilateral Divorce
-
Marriage and Divorce: Changes and Their Driving Forces
By Betsey Stevenson and Justin Wolfers
-
Marriage and Divorce: Changes and Their Driving Forces
By Betsey Stevenson and Justin Wolfers
-
Marriage and Divorce: Changes and Their Driving Forces
By Betsey Stevenson and Justin Wolfers
-
Marriage and Divorce: Changes and Their Driving Forces
By Betsey Stevenson and Justin Wolfers