Cooperation Through Communication: Teams and Individuals in a Finitely Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma Game

23 Pages Posted: 23 Jul 2017

See all articles by John H. Kagel

John H. Kagel

Ohio State University (OSU) - Economics

Date Written: July 4, 2017

Abstract

For both two person teams and individuals unrestricted communication between opponents in a finitely repeated prisoner dilemma game results in stage-one cooperation rates of between 95-100%. Content analysis of between opponent communication focuses on the increased earnings cooperation can achieve, with minimal discussion of punishment for failing to cooperate. Restoring cooperation after an early stage-game defection typically requires compensating the aggrieved player. Between opponent discussions underlying cooperation focus on the mutual benefit from cooperation (earning more money and fairer than competing), with threats for failing to live up to agreements coming in a distant third.

Keywords: finitely repeated prisoners’ dilemma game, cheap talk, teams compared to individuals

JEL Classification: D03, C92, C73

Suggested Citation

Kagel, John H., Cooperation Through Communication: Teams and Individuals in a Finitely Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma Game (July 4, 2017). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3006674 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3006674

John H. Kagel (Contact Author)

Ohio State University (OSU) - Economics ( email )

1945 North High Street
Columbus, OH 43210-1172
United States

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