Cooperation Through Communication: Teams and Individuals in a Finitely Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma Game
23 Pages Posted: 23 Jul 2017
Date Written: July 4, 2017
Abstract
For both two person teams and individuals unrestricted communication between opponents in a finitely repeated prisoner dilemma game results in stage-one cooperation rates of between 95-100%. Content analysis of between opponent communication focuses on the increased earnings cooperation can achieve, with minimal discussion of punishment for failing to cooperate. Restoring cooperation after an early stage-game defection typically requires compensating the aggrieved player. Between opponent discussions underlying cooperation focus on the mutual benefit from cooperation (earning more money and fairer than competing), with threats for failing to live up to agreements coming in a distant third.
Keywords: finitely repeated prisoners’ dilemma game, cheap talk, teams compared to individuals
JEL Classification: D03, C92, C73
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation