Regulating the New Self-Employed in the Uber Economy: What Role for EU Competition Law?

38 Pages Posted: 28 Jul 2017 Last revised: 12 Aug 2017

See all articles by Victoria Daskalova

Victoria Daskalova

Utrecht University - Utrecht Law School; TILEC (Tilburg Law and Economics Center)

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Date Written: July 26, 2017

Abstract

This paper discusses the role that EU competition law can play in regulating the ‘new self-employed’ – precarious workers formally considered to be micro-enterprises. Specific attention is paid to the newest type of ‘new self-employed’, namely those engaged via matchmaking platforms arranging for work to be contracted ‘on-demand’. Despite their unequal bargaining position, self-employed are barred from bargaining collectively due to the (EU) competition rules. The paper argues that the problem will not be solved by modifying the respective tests for ‘worker’ and ‘undertaking’ in EU law or by introducing exceptions under Article 101 TFEU. Then it adopts a regulatory approach to canvass the different legal instruments available to address exploitation concerns in the context of the Uber economy and discusses the role that EU competition law can play in such a regime.

Keywords: sharing economy, self-employed, collective bargaining, cartel prohibition, abuse of dominant position, EU competition law

JEL Classification: J290, J380, J420, J530, J580, L410, L530

Suggested Citation

Daskalova, Victoria I., Regulating the New Self-Employed in the Uber Economy: What Role for EU Competition Law? (July 26, 2017). TILEC Discussion Paper No. 2017-028, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3009120 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3009120

Victoria I. Daskalova (Contact Author)

Utrecht University - Utrecht Law School ( email )

Utrecht
Netherlands

TILEC (Tilburg Law and Economics Center) ( email )

Warandelaan 2
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

HOME PAGE: http://https://www.tilburguniversity.edu/research/institutes-and-research-groups/tilec/

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