Prize and Incentives in Double-Elimination Tournaments
11 Pages Posted: 2 Aug 2017
Date Written: August 6, 2016
Abstract
I examine a game-theoretical model of two variants of double-elimination tournaments, and derive the equilibrium behavior of symmetric players and the optimal prize allocation assuming a designer aims to maximize total effort. I compare these theoretical properties to the well-known single-elimination tournament.
Keywords: Elimination Tournaments, Optimal Prize Allocation
JEL Classification: C7, D4, D7
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Huang, Lingbo, Prize and Incentives in Double-Elimination Tournaments (August 6, 2016). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3011715 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3011715
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