Prize and Incentives in Double-Elimination Tournaments

11 Pages Posted: 2 Aug 2017

Date Written: August 6, 2016

Abstract

I examine a game-theoretical model of two variants of double-elimination tournaments, and derive the equilibrium behavior of symmetric players and the optimal prize allocation assuming a designer aims to maximize total effort. I compare these theoretical properties to the well-known single-elimination tournament.

Keywords: Elimination Tournaments, Optimal Prize Allocation

JEL Classification: C7, D4, D7

Suggested Citation

Huang, Lingbo, Prize and Incentives in Double-Elimination Tournaments (August 6, 2016). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3011715 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3011715

Lingbo Huang (Contact Author)

Nanjing Audit University ( email )

86 Yushan W Rd
Pukou, Jiangsu 210017
China

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