Strategy-Proofness and Single-Crossing

Theoretical Economics 4 (2009), 127–163

Posted: 15 Aug 2017

Date Written: November 10, 2007

Abstract

This paper analyzes strategy-proof collective choice rules when individuals have single-crossing preferences on a finite and ordered set of social alternatives. It shows that a social choice rule is anonymous, unanimous, and strategy-proof on a maximal single-crossing domain if and only if it is an extended median rule with n−1 fixed ballots distributed over the individuals’ most preferred alternatives. As a by-product, the paper also proves that strategy-proofness implies the tops-only property. It also offers a strategic foundation for the so-called “single-crossing version” of the Median Voter Theorem, by showing that the median ideal point can be implemented in dominant strategies by a direct mechanism in which every individual reveals his true preferences.

Keywords: Single-Crossing, Strategy-Proofness, Tops-Only, Peak Rules

JEL Classification: C72, D71, D78

Suggested Citation

Saporiti, Alejandro, Strategy-Proofness and Single-Crossing (November 10, 2007). Theoretical Economics 4 (2009), 127–163, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3018161

Alejandro Saporiti (Contact Author)

University of Manchester ( email )

Oxford Road
Manchester, N/A M13 9PL
United Kingdom

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