Sorting and Private Education in Italy

37 Pages Posted: 28 Feb 2002

See all articles by Giuseppe Bertola

Giuseppe Bertola

University of Turin - Department of Economics

Daniele Checchi

Università degli Studi di Milano - Dipartimento di Economia Politica e Aziendale (DEPA); IZA Institute of Labor Economics; IRVAPP

Date Written: February 2002

Abstract

This Paper discusses reforms of Italian secondary schools' curriculum and funding in light of theoretical considerations, of the experience of other countries, and of empirical evidence. We briefly review socio-economic views on the schooling system's role in shaping the social structure and productive potential of new generations. The current structure of the Italian secondary school system lets the student population sort itself, on the basis of individuals' financial and cultural background, along both vocational versus comprehensive and public versus private dimensions. We characterize the outcome of this sorting, and its relationship to further educational experience, with a statistical analysis of a sample of University students. Not surprisingly, we find that in Italy Catholic private schools play a different role from that of their American counterparts, which have been found to improve the performance of relatively poor students. Italian confessional and other private schools appear to cater to the needs of relatively less talented students from relatively rich family backgrounds.

Keywords: Education quality, education reform

JEL Classification: I20

Suggested Citation

Bertola, Giuseppe and Checchi, Daniele, Sorting and Private Education in Italy (February 2002). CEPR Discussion Paper No. 3198, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=302182

Giuseppe Bertola (Contact Author)

University of Turin - Department of Economics ( email )

Lungo Dora Siena 100
Torino, 10153
Italy
+39 011 670 4405 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/site/gipbert

Daniele Checchi

Università degli Studi di Milano - Dipartimento di Economia Politica e Aziendale (DEPA) ( email )

Milan, 20122
Italy
+39 02 5032 1519 (Phone)
+39 02 5032 1505 (Fax)

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

IRVAPP ( email )

Via Santa Croce 77
Trento, I-38122
Italy

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