On the Inadmissibility of the Aggregated Probabilities Principle

The International Journal of Evidence and Proof (2014)

19 Pages Posted: 11 Sep 2017 Last revised: 18 Sep 2017

See all articles by Doron Menashe

Doron Menashe

University of Haifa - Faculty of Law

Date Written: September 4, 2017

Abstract

This article is a response to the argument that, under certain conditions, courts should be permitted to convict a defendant even though the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant committed any specific offence of which he was accused. This new decision principle has been described as the Aggregated Probabilities Principle (APP). However, a correct mathematical approach to probabilistic interdependence among offences would render APP impractical. It is also doubtful whether adopting APP would actually lead to a reduction of enforcement costs or to minimising adjudication errors, and it would require that we choose between a reduction in equality or in deterrence.

Keywords: Distinct Probabilities Principle, Aggregated Probabilities Principle; Standard of proof

Suggested Citation

Menashe, Doron, On the Inadmissibility of the Aggregated Probabilities Principle (September 4, 2017). The International Journal of Evidence and Proof (2014) , Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3031880

Doron Menashe (Contact Author)

University of Haifa - Faculty of Law ( email )

Mount Carmel
Haifa, 31905
Israel

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