Conceptualizing the Intentional Torts

40 Pages Posted: 11 Sep 2017 Last revised: 1 Nov 2017

See all articles by Mark Geistfeld

Mark Geistfeld

New York University School of Law

Date Written: September 1, 2017

Abstract

According to the most recent draft of the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Intentional Torts to Persons, the intentional torts protect the rightholder’s interests differently from negligence-based rules and strict liability, placing them into a distinct substantive category. This conceptualization, however, does not provide courts with adequate guidance on how to formulate the element of intent. Different formulations can protect the rightholder’s interests differently from negligence and strict liability, so something else must determine the appropriate way to formulate the element of intent.

The draft Restatement’s reasoning can be easily extended to provide a more useful conceptualization of the intentional torts. The practice of tort law involves the enforcement of behavioral norms, and so the substantive categories of tort law should correspond to normatively distinguishable categories of behavior. For tort purposes, three different paradigmatic forms of social behavior are relevant: aggressive interactions; interactions of mutual advantage; and the remaining nonaggressive, risk-creating interactions that are not motivated by an expectation of mutual benefit. Within this normative framework, the category of intentional torts is defined by aggressive interactions, which involve intentional harms that are normatively different from accidental harms. The intentional torts accordingly protect different interests in a distinctive manner as per the rationale in the draft Restatement.

This normative framework straightforwardly explains a number of established rules while also resolving two questions of intent that have vexed courts and commentators. Difficult issues of intent involve hard questions about how the conduct is best categorized for tort purposes. Once the categories have been conceptualized in behavioral terms, the element of intent has a clear substantive purpose: it determines whether or not an interaction is aggressive and properly governed by the intentional torts.

Suggested Citation

Geistfeld, Mark, Conceptualizing the Intentional Torts (September 1, 2017). 10 J. Tort Law (Forthcoming 2017), NYU School of Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 17-31, NYU Law and Economics Research Paper No. 17-33, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3034522

Mark Geistfeld (Contact Author)

New York University School of Law ( email )

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