Settling with Multiple Litigants
Review of Law & Economics, Vol. 6(1), pp. 125-144, 2010
Posted: 19 Sep 2017
Date Written: September 6, 2010
Abstract
This paper considers a class of complete information pretrial settlement bargaining games in which externalities can naturally arise due to the existence of multiple litigants. As opposed to earlier literature, it is shown that parties can always settle even though there are bargaining externalities.
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Nakkas, Alper, Settling with Multiple Litigants (September 6, 2010). Review of Law & Economics, Vol. 6(1), pp. 125-144, 2010, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3037455
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