The Effect of Corruption and Culture on Mandatory Disclosure Compliance Levels: Goodwill Reporting in Europe

Journal of International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation, 31, p. 52-73

Posted: 19 Sep 2017 Last revised: 31 May 2023

See all articles by Francesco Mazzi

Francesco Mazzi

University of Florence - Department of Business Economics

Richard Slack

Durham Business School

Ioannis Tsalavoutas

University of Glasgow - Accounting and Finance Group

Date Written: July 28, 2017

Abstract

While responding to calls for research and regulatory concerns regarding the influence of country level characteristics on the completeness and quality of financial statements, we examine the simultaneous influences of corruption and culture on levels of compliance with mandatory disclosure requirements. We use a panel dataset of European companies, for 2008 to 2011, and measure compliance with IFRS goodwill disclosure requirements utilising a disclosure index. Corruption is measured using the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) and Schwartz (2008) bipolar cultural dimensions are used as measures of culture. We find that compliance levels vary significantly across sample firms, countries and over time. The level of corruption and two of the three cultural dimensions (Hierarchy and Mastery) are significantly related to these levels of compliance. These findings also hold for the changes in compliance levels over time. On that basis, the paper makes original contributions to our understanding of determinants of compliance levels with IFRS mandatory disclosure requirements.

Keywords: Compliance, Corruption, Culture, Disclosure, Goodwill

JEL Classification: M40, M41

Suggested Citation

Mazzi, Francesco and Slack, Richard and Tsalavoutas, Ioannis, The Effect of Corruption and Culture on Mandatory Disclosure Compliance Levels: Goodwill Reporting in Europe (July 28, 2017). Journal of International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation, 31, p. 52-73, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3037848

Francesco Mazzi

University of Florence - Department of Business Economics ( email )

Via delle Pandette 9
Florence, Florence 50132
Italy
0039 055 4374684 (Phone)
0039 055 4374910 (Fax)

Richard Slack

Durham Business School ( email )

Mill Hill Lane
Durham, Durham DH1 3LB
United Kingdom

Ioannis Tsalavoutas (Contact Author)

University of Glasgow - Accounting and Finance Group ( email )

Glasgow, Scotland G12 8QQ
United Kingdom

HOME PAGE: http://www.gla.ac.uk/schools/business/staff/yannistsalavoutas/

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