Can Power Be Self-Legitimating? Williams's Critique of Hobbes and Weber on Political Legitimacy

Abstract

In defending his theory of political legitimacy, Bernard Williams deliberately aligns himself with the tradition of political realism. Commenters have focused on Williams’s critique of political moralism, but in this paper we investigate his implicit critique of realism by contrasting his theory with the views of Thomas Hobbes and Max Weber. This comparison is important because Williams draws heavily on both Hobbes and Weber in formulating his views, while at the same time rejecting crucial aspects. We argue that Williams is not satisfied with Hobbes because the political relationship is defined in terms of legitimacy, thereby eliminating space for illegitimate politics. This draws Williams towards a Weberian account, who demarcates legitimate domination in terms of a belief in the validity of power. We show that Weber’s view offers a non-moralist standard of legitimacy that also provides critical purchase, via an ethic of rule and ethic of responsibility. Finally, we show that Williams cannot reject Weber’s realist form of legitimacy because it is based on the very maxim that Williams puts at the heart of his realism -- namely, that power cannot be self-legitimating. Our analysis shows that Williams’s partial rejection of Hobbes and Weber cannot be sustained on realist grounds alone.