Why the Poor Vote in Dominant-Party Systems: Community Carrots and Social Sticks

Posted: 29 Sep 2017

See all articles by Leah Rosenzweig

Leah Rosenzweig

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Department of Political Science

Date Written: September 14, 2017

Abstract

In dominant-party states, why do individuals vote in elections with foregone conclusions? It is especially curious in these cases why the poor — who are often ignored or marginalized by the state — decide to cast their ballots. I posit that communities that collectively rely on the government for public services foster social norms of voting to influence turnout. Motivated by the perception that regimes reward high turnout areas with public goods, communities use esteem “carrots” and social “sticks” to overcome free-rider incentives and increase the likelihood of receiving services. Individuals who rely on their community for non-material goods, such as information and kinship ties, are most likely to vote. Social norms of voting are stronger in communities that are more dependent on government services. Findings from a lab-in-the-field voting experiment in rural Tanzania indicate the existence of a social norm of voting. In the experiment, respondents are 11 to 13 percentage points more likely to vote in the presence of their peers, compared to when they are in private. The theory, which applies broadly to many patronage-based regimes, demonstrates how communities sustain social norms of voting even where elections lack legitimacy and explains the paradox of high turnout in dominant-party systems.

Keywords: Vote, Poor, Dominant Party, Marginalized, Incentive, Norm, Carrot

Suggested Citation

Rosenzweig, Leah, Why the Poor Vote in Dominant-Party Systems: Community Carrots and Social Sticks (September 14, 2017). MIT Political Science Department Research Paper No. 2017-25, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3044008

Leah Rosenzweig (Contact Author)

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Department of Political Science ( email )

77 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02139
United States

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