Information Aggregation and Transmission in Network Games

35 Pages Posted: 6 Oct 2017 Last revised: 20 Oct 2022

See all articles by Fan-chin Kung

Fan-chin Kung

East Carolina University

Ping Wang

Washington University in St. Louis - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Date Written: October 17, 2022

Abstract

Observing the increasingly important roles played by the creation and transmission of information and tacit knowledge, we construct an information-network model incorporating both information transmitters and information aggregators. Given information-processing roles in aggregation or transmission, we establish various general properties concerning the existence of a network equilibrium, its optimality and the patterns of equilibrium and optimal configuration. We then allow for endogenous choice of the information-processing roles. We prove the existence and show that, with sufficiently small link maintenance costs, the monocentric network with one aggregator connecting to all other agents as transmitters on a tree graph is the unique configuration. In general, a rich array of equilibrium configurations may emerge, including core-star, star-with-satellites and cycles. We further characterize an information-processing chain network with all information aggregators and transmitters linked along a chain and compute numerically the ranges of transmission decays and link costs within which a network equilibrium arises.

Keywords: Information transmission and aggregation, equilibrium and optimal networks, information-processing chain

JEL Classification: D20, C71

Suggested Citation

Kung, Fan-chin and Wang, Ping, Information Aggregation and Transmission in Network Games (October 17, 2022). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3048642 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3048642

Fan-chin Kung (Contact Author)

East Carolina University ( email )

Brewster A438
Greenville, NC 27858
United States

HOME PAGE: http://myweb.ecu.edu/kungf/

Ping Wang

Washington University in St. Louis - Department of Economics ( email )

One Brookings Drive
St. Louis, MO 63130
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

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