Regulation Fair Disclosure and the Private Information of Analysts

47 Pages Posted: 14 Apr 2002

Date Written: April 2002

Abstract

This paper reports evidence that Regulation Fair Disclosure has had its desired effect of reducing selective disclosure of information about future earnings to individual analysts without reducing the total amount of information disclosed. In particular, it finds that multi-forecast days, which typically follow public announcements or events, now account for over 70 percent of the new information about earnings, up from 35 percent before Reg FD. This result is obtained by applying a new methodology from Zitzewitz (2001a) for measuring the information content of individual forecasts. These results are strongest for the fourth quarter of 2000, when the SEC Chairman who introduced Reg FD was still in office; since the change in administration, some of the initial effects of Reg FD appear to have been reversed.

Keywords: Reg FD, analysts, information, earnings forecasts

JEL Classification: G29, D82, M41

Suggested Citation

Zitzewitz, Eric W., Regulation Fair Disclosure and the Private Information of Analysts (April 2002). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=305219 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.305219

Eric W. Zitzewitz (Contact Author)

Dartmouth College ( email )

Hanover, NH 03755
United States
603-646-2891 (Phone)
603-646-2122 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.dartmouth.edu/~ericz

NBER ( email )

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?

Paper statistics

Downloads
1,174
Abstract Views
6,678
Rank
33,458
PlumX Metrics