The Role of Politics in Repricing Executive Options
Posted: 26 Mar 2002
There are 2 versions of this paper
The Role of Politics in Repricing Executive Options
Number of pages: 27
Posted: 06 Mar 2002
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Abstract
We explore how CEO power impacts executive option repricing. The spread between the option strike price and the market value of the stock impacts the likelihood of repricing. This effect is enhanced when the CEO is the Chairman of the Board. Firm and CEO visibility, having more board members appointed after the CEO, having a classified board, and higher percentages of CEO and institutional ownership reduce the impact of spread on the likelihood of repricing.
Keywords: stock options, power, corporate governance
JEL Classification: G3, M1
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Pollock, Tim and Fischer, Harald M. and Wade, James B., The Role of Politics in Repricing Executive Options. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=305222
Harald M. Fischer
University of Connecticut - School of Business ( email )
368 Fairfield Road
Storrs, CT 06269-2041
United States
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