Aspects of the Theory of Environmental Policy in Developing Countries

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society, Vol. 7, No. 1, pp. 53-58, 2002

Posted: 26 Mar 2002

See all articles by Amitrajeet A. Batabyal

Amitrajeet A. Batabyal

Rochester Institute of Technology

Hamid Beladi

University of Texas at San Antonio - College of Business - Department of Economics

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Abstract

We examine two issues pertaining to the conduct of environmental policy in developing countries (DCs). First, when faced with a self-financing constraint, should an environmental authority (EA) raise/lower pollution taxes over time or should it run a deficit/surplus? Second, given recent findings regarding the time inconsistency of optimal environmental policy, should an EA make its preferences about the relative benefits of environmental protection versus production public, or should it keep its preferences private? Our paper shows that when faced with a self-financing constraint, it is optimal for the EA to run a deficit/surplus. Second, social losses are lower when this EA keeps its preferences private.

Note: This is a description of the paper and is not the actual abstract.

Keywords: Developing Country, Dynamic Consistency, Environmental Policy, Taxation

JEL Classification: O29, Q28

Suggested Citation

Batabyal, Amitrajeet A. and Beladi, Hamid, Aspects of the Theory of Environmental Policy in Developing Countries. Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society, Vol. 7, No. 1, pp. 53-58, 2002, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=305284

Amitrajeet A. Batabyal (Contact Author)

Rochester Institute of Technology ( email )

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Hamid Beladi

University of Texas at San Antonio - College of Business - Department of Economics ( email )

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