The Evil Eye: Eye Gaze and Competitiveness in Social Decision Making

European Journal of Social Psychology, Vol. 48, No. 3, pp. 388-396, April 2018

22 Pages Posted: 21 Oct 2017 Last revised: 17 Apr 2018

See all articles by Mauro Giacomantonio

Mauro Giacomantonio

Sapienza University of Rome

Jennifer Jordan

University of Groningen

Francesca Federico

Sapienza University of Rome

Martijn J. van den Assem

Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam

Dennie van Dolder

University of Essex - Department of Economics

Date Written: October 18, 2017

Abstract

We demonstrate that a person’s eye gaze and his/her competitiveness are closely intertwined in social decision making. In an exploratory examination of this relationship, Study 1 uses field data from a high-stakes TV game show to demonstrate that the frequency by which contestants gaze at their opponent’s eyes predicts their defection in a variant on the prisoner’s dilemma. Studies 2 and 3 use experiments to examine the underlying causality and demonstrate that the relationship between gazing and competitive behavior is bi-directional. In Study 2, fixation on the eyes, compared to the face, increases competitive behavior toward the target in an ultimatum game. In Study 3, we manipulate the framing of a negotiation (cooperative vs. competitive) and use an eye tracker to measure fixation number and time spent fixating on the counterpart’s eyes. We find that a competitive negotiation elicits more gazing, which in turn leads to more competitive behavior.

Keywords: eye gaze, eye fixation, competition, competitive behavior

JEL Classification: C72, D03

Suggested Citation

Giacomantonio, Mauro and Jordan, Jennifer and Federico, Francesca and van den Assem, Martijn J. and van Dolder, Dennie, The Evil Eye: Eye Gaze and Competitiveness in Social Decision Making (October 18, 2017). European Journal of Social Psychology, Vol. 48, No. 3, pp. 388-396, April 2018, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3055092

Mauro Giacomantonio (Contact Author)

Sapienza University of Rome ( email )

Jennifer Jordan

University of Groningen ( email )

P.O. Box 800
9700 AH Groningen, Groningen 9700 AV
Netherlands

Francesca Federico

Sapienza University of Rome ( email )

Martijn J. Van den Assem

Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam ( email )

De Boelelaan 1105
Amsterdam, 1081HV
Netherlands

Dennie Van Dolder

University of Essex - Department of Economics ( email )

Wivenhoe Park
Colchester CO4 3SQ
United Kingdom

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