The Empirical Basis for Antitrust: Cartels, Mergers, and Remedies

26 Pages Posted: 31 Oct 2017

See all articles by James Langenfeld

James Langenfeld

Loyola University Chicago School of Law; Navigant Consulting, Inc.

Date Written: December 22, 2016

Abstract

There have been a number of studies attempting to quantify the impact of cartels and mergers on prices. The state of the art of empirical analysis related to antitrust is best illustrated by the research of John Connor and John Kwoka. Connor summarizes the existing empirical research that estimate the magnitude of the impact of cartels on prices. He estimates that cartels increase prices by over 20% on average, and concludes that fines and damage awards do not sufficiently deter cartels and should be larger. Kwoka summarizes research estimating the impact of mergers on prices and other market outcomes, and recommends tighter merger regulation. Since the works of both have been used to support more aggressive antitrust enforcement, it is important to understand the basis for their research and how it is best weighed. This article critiques their substantial efforts to add more empirical content as the basis for antitrust policies.

Keywords: Cartels, Price Fixing, Merger Regulation, Price Increases, Natural Experiments

JEL Classification: C51, K21, L13, L44, L49

Suggested Citation

Langenfeld, James and Langenfeld, James, The Empirical Basis for Antitrust: Cartels, Mergers, and Remedies (December 22, 2016). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3061922 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3061922

James Langenfeld (Contact Author)

Navigant Consulting, Inc. ( email )

30 South Wacker Drive
Chicago, IL 60606
United States

Loyola University Chicago School of Law

25 E. Pearson
Chicago, IL 60611
United States

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