Kuhn's Theorem for Extensive Games with Unawareness

22 Pages Posted: 3 Nov 2017

See all articles by Burkhard C. Schipper

Burkhard C. Schipper

University of California, Davis - Department of Economics

Date Written: November 1, 2017

Abstract

We extend Kuhn's Theorem to extensive games with unawareness. This extension is not entirely obvious: First, extensive games with non-trivial unawareness involve a forest of partially ordered game trees rather than just one game tree. An information set at a history in one tree may consist of histories in a less expressive tree. Consequently, perfect recall takes a more complicated form as players may also become aware of new actions during the play. Second, strategies can only be partially an object of ex-ante choice in games with unawareness. Finally, histories that a player may expect to reach with a strategy profile may not be the histories that actually occur with this strategy profile, requiring us to define appropriate notions of equivalence of strategies.

Keywords: perfect recall, mixed strategy, behavior strategy, unawareness

JEL Classification: C72, D83

Suggested Citation

Schipper, Burkhard C., Kuhn's Theorem for Extensive Games with Unawareness (November 1, 2017). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3063853 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3063853

Burkhard C. Schipper (Contact Author)

University of California, Davis - Department of Economics ( email )

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HOME PAGE: http://www.econ.ucdavis.edu/faculty/schipper/

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