Waiting for Work

42 Pages Posted: 4 Jul 2004 Last revised: 3 Apr 2022

See all articles by George A. Akerlof

George A. Akerlof

University of California, Berkeley; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Andrew Kenan Rose

University of California - Haas School of Business; NUS Business School; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Janet L. Yellen

University of California, Berkeley - Economic Analysis & Policy Group

Date Written: June 1990

Abstract

This paper explains upward job mobility and observed patterns of unemployment by skill as an economy recovers from a recession. Skilled unemployment is due to rational waiting by workers looking for long-term jobs when there is a "lock-in" effect. Lock-in occurs if the conditions in the labor market when a worker first accepts a job have a persistent effect on wages. Using longitudinal data, we provide empirical evidence of the cyclical pattern of wages predicted by the theory and also of lock-in.

Suggested Citation

Akerlof, George A. and Rose, Andrew Kenan and Rose, Andrew Kenan and Yellen, Janet L., Waiting for Work (June 1990). NBER Working Paper No. w3385, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=306401

George A. Akerlof (Contact Author)

University of California, Berkeley ( email )

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National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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Andrew Kenan Rose

University of California - Haas School of Business ( email )

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HOME PAGE: http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/arose

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National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

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Janet L. Yellen

University of California, Berkeley - Economic Analysis & Policy Group ( email )

Berkeley, CA 94720
United States
510.643.1397 (Phone)
510.643.1420 (Fax)