Do What (You Think) the Rich Will Do: Inequality and Belief Heterogeneity in Public Good Provision

61 Pages Posted: 16 Nov 2017 Last revised: 13 Dec 2018

See all articles by Andrea FM Martinangeli

Andrea FM Martinangeli

Burgundy School of Business; University of Gothenburg - Centre for Collective Action (CeCAR)

Date Written: November 13, 2017

Abstract

Beliefs about others' cooperativeness are among the strongest determinants of cooperative behaviours. Beliefs about different others, however, are not necessarily uniform, nor necessarily related to past behaviours: different expectations about different others might solely originate from differences in observed individual characteristics. Finally, not all such beliefs need drive conditional behaviour alike. In an experimental public good game with heterogeneous endowments, I find that rich subjects are expected to cooperate more by both rich and poor individuals, and that behaviours of both the rich and poor significantly correlate only with beliefs about the rich. I further find that an intervention aimed at downplaying the salience of heterogeneity has no impact on neither beliefs nor cooperation. I conclude with implications for information dissemination about uncooperative behaviour in the mass media and avenues for further research.

Keywords: belief formation, cooperation, experiment, group identity, inequality, public goods

JEL Classification: C91, H41

Suggested Citation

Martinangeli, Andrea, Do What (You Think) the Rich Will Do: Inequality and Belief Heterogeneity in Public Good Provision (November 13, 2017). Working Paper of the Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance No. 2017-6, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3070528 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3070528

Andrea Martinangeli (Contact Author)

Burgundy School of Business ( email )

29 Rue Sambin
Dijon, 21000
France

University of Gothenburg - Centre for Collective Action (CeCAR) ( email )

Box 100, S-405 30
Gothenburg
Sweden

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