A Note on Ex-Ante Stable Lotteries

10 Pages Posted: 29 Nov 2017 Last revised: 30 Nov 2017

Date Written: November 25, 2017

Abstract

We study ex-ante priority respecting (ex-ante stable) lotteries in the context of object allocation under thick priorities. We show that ex-ante stability as a fairness condition is very demanding: Only few agent-object pairs have a positive probability of being matched in an ex-ante stable assignment. We interpret our result as an impossibility result. With ex-ante stability one cannot go much beyond randomly breaking ties and implementing a (deterministically) stable matching with respect to the broken ties.

Keywords: Matching; School Choice; Lotteries; Ex-Ante Stability

JEL Classification: C78, D47

Suggested Citation

Schlegel, Jan Christoph, A Note on Ex-Ante Stable Lotteries (November 25, 2017). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3077210 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3077210

Jan Christoph Schlegel (Contact Author)

City University London ( email )

Northampton Square
London, EC1V 0HB
United Kingdom

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