Relationship Trading in OTC Markets

49 Pages Posted: 12 Dec 2017

See all articles by Terrence Hendershott

Terrence Hendershott

University of California, Berkeley - Haas School of Business

Dan Li

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

Dmitry Livdan

University of California, Berkeley

Norman Schuerhoff

Swiss Finance Institute - HEC Lausanne

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: November 2017

Abstract

We examine the network of trading relations between insurers and dealers in the over-the-counter corporate bond market. Comprehensive regulatory data shows that many insurers use only one dealer while the largest insurers have networks of up to forty dealers. Large insurers receive better prices than small insurers. However, execution costs are a non-monotone function of the network size, increasing once the network size exceeds 20 dealers. To understand these facts we build a model of decentralized trade in which insurers trade off the benefits of repeat business against dealer competition. The model can quantitatively fit the distribution of insurers' network sizes and how prices depend on insurers' size.

Keywords: corporate bond, Decentralization, Financial Networks, liquidity, Over-the-counter market, trading cost

JEL Classification: G12, G14, G24

Suggested Citation

Hendershott, Terrence J. and Li, Dan and Livdan, Dmitry and Schuerhoff, Norman, Relationship Trading in OTC Markets (November 2017). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP12472, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3082338

Terrence J. Hendershott (Contact Author)

University of California, Berkeley - Haas School of Business ( email )

545 Student Services Building, #1900
2220 Piedmont Avenue
Berkeley, CA 94720
United States

Dan Li

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System ( email )

20th and C Streets, NW
Mail Stop 89
Washington, DC 20551
United States

Dmitry Livdan

University of California, Berkeley ( email )

545 Student Services Building, #1900
2220 Piedmont Avenue
Berkeley, CA 94720
United States
(510) 642-4733 (Phone)

Norman Schuerhoff

Swiss Finance Institute - HEC Lausanne ( email )

Chavannes-près-Renens
Switzerland

Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?

Paper statistics

Downloads
2
Abstract Views
985
PlumX Metrics