Online Reputation and the Regulation of Information Asymmetries in the Platform Economy

Critical Analysis of Law, 2018, Forthcoming

University of Groningen Faculty of Law Research Paper No. 2/2018

37 Pages Posted: 11 Dec 2017 Last revised: 18 Mar 2018

See all articles by Sofia Ranchordas

Sofia Ranchordas

Tilburg University; Libera Universita Internazionale degli Studi Sociali

Date Written: December 4, 2017

Abstract

In the last years, online rating and reputational mechanisms have become increasingly important in the regulation of behavior in the platform economy. Consumers tend to rely on online reviews to distinguish between service providers both in the business-to-consumer and peer-to-peer economy. The European Commission, the Federal Trade Commission as well as a strand of legal scholarship have praised these online mechanisms for generating valuable information, reducing market failures, and managing consumer risks. However, this position has overlooked evidence suggesting that the additional data provided by online reputation might not be able to address information asymmetries due to the multiple shortcomings of existing online reputational mechanisms. In this article, I discuss the regulatory potential of online reputational feedback and offer a nuanced reflection on the traditional assumption that the availability of more information on the market reduces the need for public regulation. I suggest a co-regulatory framework for the regulation of online reputation that could help promote the transparency and trustworthiness of these informal enforcement mechanisms.

Keywords: online reputation,reputational feedback, sharing economy, word-of-mouth, regulation, information asymmetries, co-regulation, automation

JEL Classification: K1, K19, K23

Suggested Citation

Ranchordas, Sofia, Online Reputation and the Regulation of Information Asymmetries in the Platform Economy (December 4, 2017). Critical Analysis of Law, 2018, Forthcoming, University of Groningen Faculty of Law Research Paper No. 2/2018, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3082403

Sofia Ranchordas (Contact Author)

Tilburg University ( email )

P.O. Box 90153
Tilburg, DC Noord-Brabant 5000 LE
Netherlands

Libera Universita Internazionale degli Studi Sociali ( email )

Rome
Italy

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