Does Seller Status Matter in Inter-Corporate Asset Sales?

43 Pages Posted: 3 Jan 2018 Last revised: 5 Feb 2018

See all articles by Giang Nguyen

Giang Nguyen

Waseda University - Faculty of Political Science and Economics

Hai Nguyen

The Chinese University of Hong Kong

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: February 3, 2018

Abstract

We find that acquirer shareholders gain less in inter-corporate asset transactions when the seller is a private firm. Both private equity and private operating sellers generate lower returns for the buyer than public sellers, but their relative gain differences are not statistically different. We also show that the gain difference cannot be explained by buyer characteristics, sample selection effects, and means of payments. However, it increases when the seller’s di-rector ownership is lower, suggesting that managerial incentives have an important influence on the gain of buyer shareholders. Consistently, the empirical evidence shows that private firms sell assets at more expensive price than public firms. Indeed, the withdrawal rate and estimated premiums are significantly higher when the seller is unlisted.

Keywords: Asset sales; Managerial discretion; Acquirer return; Premium

JEL Classification: G34

Suggested Citation

Nguyen, Giang and Nguyen, Hai, Does Seller Status Matter in Inter-Corporate Asset Sales? (February 3, 2018). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3093766 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3093766

Giang Nguyen (Contact Author)

Waseda University - Faculty of Political Science and Economics ( email )

1-6-1 Nishiwaseda
Shinjuku
Japan

Hai Nguyen

The Chinese University of Hong Kong ( email )

Shatin, N.T.
Hong Kong

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/site/nxhaivn/

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