Urbanization Patterns, Information Diffusion and Female Voting in Rural Paraguay

35 Pages Posted: 2 Jan 2018

See all articles by Alberto Chong

Alberto Chong

Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Department of Economics; Institute for Corruption Studies

Gianmarco León-Ciliotta

Universitat Pompeu Fabra and Barcelona GSE; Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE); Institute for Political Economy and Governance, Barcelona; CEPR

Vivian Roza

Inter-American Development Bank (IDB)

Martin Valdivia

Grupo de Analisis para el Desarrollo (GRADE)

Gabriela Vega

Inter-American Development Bank (IDB)

Date Written: December 2017

Abstract

We use a field experiment to evaluate the impact of two informational get-out-the-vote (GOTV) campaigns to boost female electoral participation in Paraguay. We find that public rallies have no effect either on registration or on voter turnout in the 2013 presidential elections. However, households that received door-to-door (D2D) treatment are 4.6 percentage points more likely to vote. Experimental variation on the intensity of the treatment at the locality level allows us to estimate spillover effects, which are present in localities that are geographically more concentrated, and thus may favor social interactions. Reinforcement effects to the already treated population are twice as large as diffusion to the untreated. Our results underscore the importance of taking into account urbanization patterns when designing informational campaigns.

Keywords: Electoral Politics, Paraguay, spillover effects, Urbanization, Voter Behavior

JEL Classification: D71, D72, O10, O53

Suggested Citation

Chong, Alberto and León-Ciliotta, Gianmarco and Roza, Vivian and Valdivia, Martin and Vega, Gabriela, Urbanization Patterns, Information Diffusion and Female Voting in Rural Paraguay (December 2017). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP12516, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3095565

Alberto Chong (Contact Author)

Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Department of Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 3992
Atlanta, GA 30302-3992
United States

Institute for Corruption Studies

Stevenson Hall 425
Normal, IL 61790-4200
United States

Gianmarco León-Ciliotta

Universitat Pompeu Fabra and Barcelona GSE ( email )

Ramon Trias Fargas 25-27
Barcelona, 08005
Spain
(+34) 93 542-1757 (Phone)
(+34) 93 542-1746 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/site/gianmarcoleon/

Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) ( email )

Ramon Trias Fargas 25-27
Barcelona, Catalonia 08014
Spain

Institute for Political Economy and Governance, Barcelona ( email )

Ramon Trias Fargas, 25-27
Barcelona, 08005
Spain

CEPR ( email )

London
United Kingdom

Vivian Roza

Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) ( email )

1300 New York Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20577
United States

Martin Valdivia

Grupo de Analisis para el Desarrollo (GRADE) ( email )

Av, Graú 915
Barranco, Lima
Peru

Gabriela Vega

Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) ( email )

1300 New York Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20577
United States

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