Perfect and Imperfect Strangers in Social Dilemmas
CentER Discussion Paper Series No. 2018-002
27 Pages Posted: 17 Jan 2018 Last revised: 8 Feb 2018
Date Written: January 10, 2018
Abstract
This paper focuses on social dilemma games where players may or may not meet the same partner again in the future. In line with the notion that contagion of cooperation is more likely the higher the likelihood of being re-matched with the same partner in the future, both a novel experiment and a meta-study document higher cooperation rates if this likelihood is sufficiently high.
Keywords: cooperation, contagion, matching protocol, laboratory experiment, meta-study
JEL Classification: C70, C90, D70
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Ghidoni, Riccardo and Cleave, Blair Llewellyn and Suetens, S., Perfect and Imperfect Strangers in Social Dilemmas (January 10, 2018). CentER Discussion Paper Series No. 2018-002, TILEC Discussion Paper No. 2018-007, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3100148 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3100148
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