To Reveal or Not to Reveal - the Case of Research Joint Ventures with Two-Sided Incomplete Information
GEABA - Discussion Paper No. 00-06
17 Pages Posted: 28 May 2002
There are 2 versions of this paper
To Reveal or Not to Reveal - the Case of Research Joint Ventures with Two-Sided Incomplete Information
To Reveal or Not to Reveal: The Case of Research Joint Ventures with Two-Sided Incomplete Information
Date Written: 2000
Abstract
Firms' incentives to form RJVs are analyzed in an incomplete information framework when technological know-how is private information. Firms first decide on cooperation and then compete for a patent in a second price auction. Provided that firms have to indicate their willingness to cooperate by revealing a fraction of their knowhow it can be shown that non-cooperation is always an equilibrium. If this fraction is sufficiently low cooperation can also occur in equilibrium. For intermediate levels of know-how revelation there exists an equilibrium in which only firms with low know-how cooperate.
Keywords: Research joint ventures, incomplete information, spillovers, second-price auction
JEL Classification: O31, L13, D82
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?
Recommended Papers
-
Information Sharing in a Supply Chain with Horizontal Competition
By Lode Li
-
Returns Policies and Retail Price Competition
By Paddy Padmanabhan and Ivan P. L. Png
-
Confidentiality and Information Sharing in Supply Chain Coordination
By Lode Li and Hongtao Zhang
-
Information and Inventory in Distribution Channels
By Ganesh Iyer, Chakravarthi Narasimhan, ...
-
Strategic Information Revelation in an R&D Race with Spillovers
By Jos Jansen
-
Product Differentiation, Asymmetric Information and International Mergers
By Larry D. Qiu and Wen Zhou
-
Information Acquisition Decisions and the Choice of Financial Year-Ends
By Nishi Sinha and Haim Dov Fried
-
Bilateral Information Sharing in Oligopoly
By Sergio Currarini and Francesco Feri