The 2016 Italian Consolidated Law on Public Entities Owned Companies: Towards a More Consistent Private Law Approach

The Italian Law Journal n. 2 (2017)

Bocconi Legal Studies Research Paper 3103623

16 Pages Posted: 24 Jan 2018 Last revised: 14 Mar 2018

See all articles by Miriam Allena

Miriam Allena

Bocconi University - Department of Law

Francesco Goisis

University of Milan - Department of Public, Civil Procedure, International and European Law

Date Written: December 12, 2017

Abstract

The article aims to analyze the model of company emerging from the new Italian consolidated Law on public entities owned companies of 2016, coming to the conclusion that, especially given the principles of the legislative delegation and the European Union law requirements, such companies are characterized as fully for profit and private. Public interest represents therefore an external interest, which is secondary to the common economic interest of the shareholders. In this understanding, norms apparently bearing a ‘public law mark’ can be understood in light of a correct perception of the notion of ‘pursuit of profit’ and of the principal agency theory, elaborated by the economic analysis of law.

Keywords: Public-Entities Owned Companies, Public Interest Purpose, Profit-Making Purpose, Italian Consolidated Law 19 August 2016 No 175

Suggested Citation

Allena, Miriam and Goisis, Francesco, The 2016 Italian Consolidated Law on Public Entities Owned Companies: Towards a More Consistent Private Law Approach (December 12, 2017). The Italian Law Journal n. 2 (2017), Bocconi Legal Studies Research Paper 3103623 , Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3103623

Miriam Allena (Contact Author)

Bocconi University - Department of Law ( email )

Via Roentgen, 1
Milan, Milan 20136
Italy

Francesco Goisis

University of Milan - Department of Public, Civil Procedure, International and European Law ( email )

Via Festa del Perdono 7
Milano, Milano 20121
Italy

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