The Political Economy of Opposition Groups: Peace, Terrorism, or Civil Conflict

55 Pages Posted: 18 Jan 2018

See all articles by Michael Jetter

Michael Jetter

University of Western Australia - Dept. of Economics; Institute for Corruption Studies

Bei Li

The University of Western Australia

Date Written: November 28, 2017

Abstract

This paper proposes a simple framework to better understand an opposition group’s choice between peace, terrorism, and open civil conflict against the government. Our model implies that terrorism emerges if constraints on the ruling executive group are intermediate and rents are sizeable, whereas conflict looms under poor executive constraints. Analyzing annual data for up to 158 countries in a panel setting provides evidence consistent with these hypotheses. The results emerge both when considering the incidence and onset of terrorism and conflict. The corresponding magnitudes are economically sizeable. Overall, these findings can help us understand and anticipate the choices of opposition groups.

Keywords: conflict, executive constraints, foreign aid, natural resource rents, oil rents, political institutions, rents, terrorism

JEL Classification: D740, F350, O110, P470, P480, Q340

Suggested Citation

Jetter, Michael and Li, Bei, The Political Economy of Opposition Groups: Peace, Terrorism, or Civil Conflict (November 28, 2017). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 6747, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3103678 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3103678

Michael Jetter (Contact Author)

University of Western Australia - Dept. of Economics ( email )

35 Stirling Highway
Crawley, Western Australia 6009
Australia

Institute for Corruption Studies

Stevenson Hall 425
Normal, IL 61790-4200
United States

Bei Li

The University of Western Australia ( email )

35 Stirling Highway
Crawley, Western Australia 6009
AUSTRALIA

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