Ethiopia, Berbera Port and the Shifting Balance of Power in the Horn of Africa
Rising Powers Quarterly 2(4): 7-29
23 Pages Posted: 30 Jan 2018 Last revised: 23 Jan 2019
Date Written: December 1, 2017
Abstract
Upon Eritrean independence in 1993, Ethiopia became landlocked and therefore dependent on neighbors – especially Djibouti – for access to international markets. This dependency has hampered Ethiopia’s aspiration to emerge as the uncontested regional power in the Horn of Africa. This article explains how Ethiopia has attempted to manipulate extra-regional interest in the Horn’s coastal zone to alleviate the major economic and political liabilities associated with landlockedness. Previewing the main argument, this article shows how Ethiopia was able to anticipate dangers and opportunities linked to growing involvement of Gulf Arab States in the ports of the region, and how it embarked on an expeditionary foreign policy mission in the Gulf (specifically in the UAE) in order to steer investment towards the port town where Addis Ababa could derive the most strategic advantage – Berbera in semi-autonomous Somaliland. Moreover, this under-reported development in the port architecture of the Horn of Africa will, we argue, have important implications for the balance of power in the Horn and potentially for Ethiopia’s bid to ascend to the top of the region’s local hierarchy.
Keywords: Gulf Arab states, Horn of Africa, landlockedness, Somalia, Somaliland, Ethiopia, port politics, regional security complex, Berbera
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