Import Penetration and Executive Compensation

Review of Financial Studies, Forthcoming

54 Pages Posted: 30 Jan 2018 Last revised: 6 Apr 2022

See all articles by Erik Lie

Erik Lie

University of Iowa - Henry B. Tippie College of Business

Keyang Daniel Yang

Washington State University

Date Written: April 5, 2022

Abstract

We first compare several measures of import penetration and find that total imports, tariffs, and exchange rates are endogenous, while imports from China are largely exogenous. Then we examine the effects of Chinese import penetration on executive compensation of US firms. We document that Chinese import penetration reduces executives’ stock grants and wealth-performance sensitivity, suggesting that competition mitigates agency problems and the need for conventional alignment mechanisms.

Keywords: Import penetration, Executive compensation

JEL Classification: F16

Suggested Citation

Lie, Erik and Yang, Keyang, Import Penetration and Executive Compensation (April 5, 2022). Review of Financial Studies, Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3107884 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3107884

Erik Lie (Contact Author)

University of Iowa - Henry B. Tippie College of Business ( email )

Acquisitions
5020 Main Library
Iowa City, IA 52242-1000
United States

Keyang Yang

Washington State University ( email )

Pullman, WA 99164
United States

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