The Dynamic Framework of Decision-Making

Abstract

This work explores dynamics existing in interactions between players. The dynamic system of games is a new attitude to modeling in which an event is modeled using several games. The model allows us to analyze the interplay capabilities and the feasibility objectives of each player after a conflict with other players objectives and capabilities. As an application, we model relations between the Soviet Union and America after World War II to October 1962, by using the dynamic system of games. The dynamic system of games as an important insight clearly has significant implications for modeling strategic interactions in which player pursue goals for increasing their personal interests. In addition, we introduce a new game in which there is a dilemma which this dilemma occurs in most societies. We investigate depends on the claim that each player in this dilemma is hyper-rational. In the concept of hyper-rational, the player thinks about profit or loss of other actors in addition to his personal profit or loss and then will choose an action which is desirable to him. In this dilemma, a weak trust has been created between players, but it is fragile.

Keywords: Game theory, Cuban missile crisis, Strategic interactions, Rationality