Analyst Information Acquisition via EDGAR

Management Science, forthcoming

47 Pages Posted: 7 Feb 2018 Last revised: 17 May 2023

See all articles by Brian Gibbons

Brian Gibbons

Oregon State University College of Business

Peter Iliev

Pennsylvania State University - Department of Finance

Jonathan Kalodimos

Oregon State University - College of Business

Date Written: January 2, 2019

Abstract

We identify analysts’ information acquisition patterns by linking EDGAR server activity to analysts’ brokerage houses. Analysts rely on EDGAR in 26% of their estimate updates with an average of eight filings viewed. We document that analysts’ attention to public information is driven by the demand for information and the analysts’ incentives and career concerns. We find that information acquisition via EDGAR is associated with a significant reduction in analysts’ forecasting error relative to their peers. This relationship is likewise present when we focus on the intensity of analyst research. Attention to public information further enables analysts to provide forecasts for more time periods and more financial metrics. Informed recommendation updates are associated with substantial and persistent abnormal returns, even when the analyst accesses historical filings. Analysts’ use of EDGAR is associated with longer and more informative analysis within recommendation reports.

Keywords: Sell-side Analysts, Earnings Estimates, Analyst Recommendations, Information Acquisition, EDGAR

JEL Classification: G12, G14, G24

Suggested Citation

Gibbons, Brian and Iliev, Peter and Kalodimos, Jonathan, Analyst Information Acquisition via EDGAR (January 2, 2019). Management Science, forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3112761 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3112761

Brian Gibbons

Oregon State University College of Business ( email )

Corvallis, OR 97331
United States

Peter Iliev (Contact Author)

Pennsylvania State University - Department of Finance ( email )

348 Business Building
University Park, PA 16802
United States

Jonathan Kalodimos

Oregon State University - College of Business ( email )

Corvallis, OR 97331
United States

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